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Abstract. According to an influential view that I call agentialism, our capacity to believe and intend directly 
on the basis of reasons—our rational agency—has a normative significance that distinguishes it from other 
kinds of agency. Agentialists maintain that insofar as we exercise rational agency, we bear a special kind 
of responsibility for our beliefs and intentions, and those attitudes are truly our own. In this paper I 
challenge these agentialist claims. My argument centers on a case in which a thinker struggles to align her 
belief to her reasons, and succeeds only by resorting to non-rational methods. I argue that she is 
responsible for the attitude generated by this struggle; that this process expresses her capacities for 
rationality and agency; and that the belief she eventually arrives at is truly her own. So rational agency is 
not distinctive in the ways that agentialists contend. 
1.  Introduction 
Our beliefs are often directly sensitive to evidence. For example, your belief that your 
neighbor is out of town is immediately revised when you see her on your street. But sometimes 
our beliefs resist the force of our reasons. Emotional factors might make it difficult for you to 
accept that your friend has committed a serious crime, even while you recognize that the 
evidence strongly points to his guilt. Similarly, our intentions are often directly sensitive to our 
reasons, but at times we have to struggle to commit to what we recognize as the best course of 
action.  
The difference between believing or intending directly on the basis of reasons, and 
having to make an effort to align one’s attitudes with one’s reasons, is central to an influential 
view that I call agentialism (Bilgrami 2006, Boyle 2011, Burge 1996, Korsgaard 1996, Moran 
2001). Agentialists maintain that our capacity to believe and intend directly on the basis of 
reasons—what I’ll call rational agency—has a special normative significance, a significance that 
distinguishes it from other kinds of agency. Insofar as we exercise rational agency, we bear a 
special kind of responsibility for our beliefs and intentions; and it is in virtue of our rational 
agency that these attitudes are truly our own.  
My main objective here is to question the idea that rational agency has this distinctive 
normative significance. I will take it as given that having beliefs that match one’s evidence, and 
intentions that match one’s best reasons for acting, is usually beneficial; so an effective means of 
achieving this alignment between attitudes and reasons is instrumentally valuable. I will also 
grant that having attitudes that conform to reasons directly is the most reliable and efficient way 
to achieve alignment between attitudes and reasons. So rational agency is preferable, on 
instrumental grounds, to alternative ways that attitudes can come to be aligned with reasons. But 
I will challenge the agentialist claim that rational agency’s normative significance, relative to 
other ways of aligning attitudes with reasons, transcends this comparative instrumental value. 
I will focus on beliefs. My argument centers on a case in which a character named Diane 
struggles to bring a recalcitrant belief into alignment with her evidence. This effort eventually 
succeeds. But it is not an exercise of rational agency, as the belief is only indirectly shaped by her 
reasons: she conforms her belief to her evidence only by exploiting a non-rational process. I will 
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argue that Diane is responsible for the attitude generated by this struggle; her success in revising 
her belief expresses her capacities for rationality and agency; and the belief she eventually arrives 
at is truly her own. So rational agency is not distinctive in the ways that agentialists contend. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains how recalcitrant beliefs, which resist 
the force of reasons, constitute a kind of cognitive fragmentation that falls short of what is 
rationally ideal. Section 3 sketches the agentialist notion of rational agency and formulates the 
agentialist thesis I will challenge. Section 4 introduces the case of Diane. Section 5 considers 
whether Diane’s recalcitrant attitude is properly classified as a belief. Section 6 argues that, 
although Diane’s means of reshaping her attitude does not qualify as an exercise of rational 
agency, it is nonetheless rational: in this section I address the idea that Diane’s approach to her 
attitude involves the “wrong kind of reasons”. Sections 7 and 8 argue that Diane exercises 
responsible agency in revising her attitude, and that the revised attitude is truly her own. Section 
9 examines whether, on pain of regress, all cases of deliberation must involve some direct 
shaping of attitudes by reasons. Section 10 responds to the claim that we cannot coherently 
embark on a process of deliberation unless we assume that this process will directly issue in a 
belief or intention.  
I conclude that working to overcome recalcitrant attitudes is as rational and agency-
involving as exercises of “rational agency”, that we are responsible for attitudes formed through 
such efforts in the same way that we are responsible for those attitudes that conform to our 
reasons directly, and that attitudes need not be an expression of rational agency in order for the 
thinker to regard them as truly her own. 
2. Recalcitrant beliefs and rationality 
We all have some beliefs (or belief-like attitudes1) that influence our reasoning and affect 
our behavior, but resist the force of countervailing evidence and clash with explicit judgments 
that we readily avow. Call these recalcitrant beliefs. Some recalcitrant beliefs, such as beliefs in racial 
or gender stereotypes, are disturbing. But many are relatively mundane. Consider a tennis player 
who takes a detour on the way to an important match to retrieve his “lucky” socks, and who 
attributes some of his past losses to having not worn the socks during those matches. He might 
nonetheless fully recognize that the belief that those socks bring him luck is a baseless 
superstition, unsupported by his overall win-loss record. And he might wish that he could shake 
that belief even as he returns home for the socks, delaying his arrival at the match. This is a case 
of recalcitrant belief.  
Recalcitrant beliefs involve a kind of fragmentation in that they are not integrated with 
the thinker’s considered judgments or her sense of her reasons. This kind of fragmentation 
differs from believing that p while merely possessing strong evidence that not-p. (On 
fragmentation of that sort, see the contributions to this volume by Borgoni and Yalcin.) In the 
cases that concern me here, an attitude fails to conform to what the thinker regards as her reasons: 
e.g., the tennis player who believes the socks are lucky yet takes his evidence to favor “there are 
no lucky socks”. The senses of “reasons” and “evidence” relevant to this discussion are limited 
 
1 There is no consensus as to whether the recalcitrant attitudes I describe are genuine beliefs. As I explain in 
Section 5 below, I remain neutral on that question. But for convenience I will use “recalcitrant belief” 
liberally, to refer to recalcitrant beliefs or belief-like attitudes. 
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to what the thinker regards as her reasons and her evidence. That is how I will use these terms 
throughout the paper.  
3.  Rational Agency 
All of us exhibit some fragmentation of this sort. We have all had—and probably all 
currently have—recalcitrant beliefs. But each of us sometimes believes exactly what we take the 
totality of our evidence to support, and do so on the basis of our assessment of the evidence. 
Agentialism accords particular significance to our capacity to believe directly on the basis of 
reasons. Agentialists maintain that, in having beliefs that are directly reasons-responsive, we 
exercise a distinctive kind of agency, rational agency, that has special normative significance. 
A belief expresses rational agency only if it is directly sensitive to reasons. Key passages 
from Moran and Boyle will help to illustrate the sense of directness at work here, and illuminate 
the significance that these two agentialists, in particular, attribute to rational agency.2 
Moran describes the exercise of rational agency, whereby rational deliberation issues in 
attitudes directly, as an exercise of authority over one’s attitudes. He contrasts this with merely 
controlling an attitude through a deliberate strategy for making one’s reasons effective. 
[I]t is because the deliberator declares the authority of reason over his thought 
and action that at the conclusion of his thinking there is no further thing he does 
to make that conclusion his actual belief or his intention. … [I]t would be an 
expression of the failure of reasoning were it to terminate not in conviction itself 
but rather in my apprehending a particular thought, or even appraising it as best, 
which I then need to find some way to make my own, my actual state of mind. 
(As in other straits, having lost authority, I could only fall back on control.)  
(Moran 2001, 131) 
Boyle shares this outlook. He says that “believing itself is an exercise of agency” 
involving “active ongoing governance”, where such governance over a state of affairs means 
that “I do not control it extrinsically by doing things to affect its unfolding” (Boyle 2009, 121, 
143). This contrast between active governance and mere (extrinsic) control dovetails with 
Moran’s distinction between authority and control. Boyle argues that the way that we hold each 
other accountable for our beliefs reflects the presumption that believers exercise direct authority 
over their beliefs, in contrast to mere control: 
Finally, it does not seem that we merely hold [the believer] accountable in the 
manner of someone who might do something about a given situation, as I might 
be held accountable for the misbehavior of my child, or the explosion of the 
munitions in my basement. I am not merely accountable for allowing an 
unreasonable belief to persist, or for having previously brought such a belief into 
existence; I am myself directly accountable for now holding the belief — for 
presently taking things to be thus-and-so, in the context of the reasons available 
to me. (Boyle 2011, 11) 
 
2 Bilgrami, Burge, and Korsgaard hold views about the significance of rational agency that are similar to these, 
at least in spirit. I focus on Moran and Boyle because their characterizations of rational agency are especially 
clear and explicit. 
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Boyle calls this authority over our beliefs “doxastic self-determination”; Moran says that 
shaping our attitudes through deliberation amounts to “self-constitution”. For Moran and Boyle, 
the exercise of rational agency defines us as the kinds of creatures we are: namely, creatures who 
are self-determining, in that we have the authority—roughly, the right, power, and 
responsibility—to govern our attitudes by our reasons.3  
It is important to understand exactly what Moran and Boyle are claiming here. It is not 
simply that the capacity to form judgments on the basis of reasoning is essential to our identity 
as rational thinkers. Judgments are occurrent states: ontologically speaking, they are events—
though on some views judgments are defined as occurrent states that (typically) yield beliefs. In 
any case, what is at issue here are beliefs, which are at least partly constituted by dispositions to 
act, reason, and feel in certain ways. (I discuss the nature of belief in Section 5.) 
Moran and Boyle are claiming that we are self-determining creatures in virtue of our 
capacity to form beliefs and intentions directly on the basis of reasoning. Recalcitrant beliefs 
represent a failure to exercise our capacity for self-determination. If I manage to overcome a 
recalcitrant belief through deliberate effort, the need to engage in effort means that my coming 
to believe in line with my reasons is not an exercise of self-determination, as I merely “control” 
the belief, and I am not truly its “author”.  
Having attitudes that are directly reasons-responsive is an especially reliable and efficient 
way to secure alignment between attitudes and reasons. So rational agency is instrumentally 
valuable. But the agentialist claims that rational agency is not just more reliable or efficient than 
alternative routes to achieving alignment between attitudes and reasons; it has a special 
normative significance. This idea is captured in the following thesis.  
The Normative Significance of Rational Agency: 
The normative significance of rational agency transcends its instrumental value as an 
especially effective means of achieving alignment between attitudes and reasons. When a 
thinker believes or intends directly on the basis of reasons, she is the responsible author of 
that attitude. We are not responsible authors of our attitudes (in an equally robust sense) 
when we manage to align them to our reasons only through deliberate effort, that is, 
through mere “control”.  
This is the thesis I will challenge here.4  
 
3 Similarly, Burge ties our status as selves to our capacity to engage in what he calls “critical reasoning”, which 
involves rational agency. “Selves are critical reasoners” (Burge 2011, 331). He envisions a thinker who 
recognizes that he has an attitude that resists the force of his reasons, and so “must face a question of how, 
by what means, to make [his] reasons effective” (Burge 1996, 113). That the thinker faces this question means 
that the relation between reasons and attitude is not direct in the sense required for critical reasoning. “In 
critical reasoning, such questions of means and control do not arise” (ibid.), for attitudes are directly sensitive 
to reasons. A reliance on a deliberate strategy for making one’s reasons effective—that is, a failure to exercise 
rational agency—means that the transformation in one’s belief is not critical reasoning. By definition, selves 
(the kinds of rational creatures we are) must be capable of critical reasoning and therefore of rational agency.  
4 In previous work, I’ve challenged a related agentialist claim: namely, that rational agency has special 
normative significance in that it is only in virtue of our rational agency that we possess certain epistemic rights 
and responsibilities (Gertler 2018). 
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4. Struggling with a recalcitrant attitude: the case of Diane  
4.1. The case of Diane 
My discussion throughout the paper will center on the following case, in which a subject 
named Diane struggles with a recalcitrant attitude. 
Stage 1.  Diane finds the arguments against the existence of free will compelling. On 
the basis of these arguments, she concludes that humans are not morally responsible 
for their actions: they don’t deserve praise or blame, reward or punishment. She tries 
to persuade her friends that praise and blame are misguided, and she resolves to stop 
condemning and lionizing others (or herself). Yet Diane remains prone to reactive 
attitudes such as resentment, especially as regards environmental issues. When she 
sees an oil company executive leaving his parked SUV one day, she feels a strong 
sense of moral indignation and indulges the urge to scratch the car with her keys. As 
she does so, she thinks to herself “he’s got it coming!”  
Stage 2.  Diane reflects on this incident and on other times she’s experienced 
condemnatory thoughts and retributive impulses. She comes to recognize that her 
overall attitude about moral responsibility is not in line with the skepticism that she 
endorses in her more contemplative moments. She resolves to work on bringing her 
attitude into alignment with her reasons by doing what she can to quell her moral 
indignation and her condemnatory thoughts and feelings. Towards this end, she takes 
up mindfulness meditation. In mindfulness meditation, one practices observing one’s 
thoughts and feelings with detachment. This reportedly diminishes the tendency to 
regard these affective states as accurate or justified, and neutralizes their emotional 
force.  
Stage 3.  Now a seasoned meditator, Diane no longer feels self-righteousness or moral 
indignation. She is no longer inclined to blame people for their actions or to regard 
them as morally responsible.  
At Stage 1, Diane has a recalcitrant attitude about moral responsibility: her tendency to 
blame and punish resists the force of her reasons. By Stage 3, she has brought her attitude into 
line with her reasons, which favor skepticism about moral responsibility. (I’ll use “MR” to refer 
to moral responsibility throughout the paper.) This alignment results from an extended, 
deliberate process, in which Diane makes use of non-rational methods to shift her attitude. So 
although Diane’s Stage 3 attitude about MR is shaped by her reasons, this shaping process is 
indirect: her attitude is not directly responsive to her reasons.  
The process by which Diane’s reasons shape her attitudes is not purely rational, since 
mindfulness meditation is not a process of deliberation or reflection on reasons. It is a non-
rational cognitive practice aimed at blunting the tendency to automatically endorse our thoughts 
and to regard our feelings as justified. There are some indications that over time, a regular 
meditation practice weakens the emotional pull of passing thoughts and feelings.5  
 
5 Goleman and Davidson (2017) outline some of the research suggesting that a regular meditation practice 
enhances emotional regulation and lessens reactivity. Insofar as mindfulness meditation weakens the 
emotional pull of thoughts and feelings, it arguably increases the relative influence of rational factors, such as 
evidence, over the meditator’s attitudes. Still, mindfulness meditation is itself a non-rational exercise: it does 
not involve evaluating thoughts or feelings to determine whether they are rationally justified or fitting.  
 6 
What matters is not whether mindfulness meditation actually has this effect. What 
matters is that Diane takes herself to have good evidence that it does, and that after practicing 
mindfulness meditation her attitude about MR is aligned with her reasons. This may be because 
that method does work; alternatively, it may be a kind of placebo effect.  
4.2. Diane’s shift in attitude is not an expression of rational agency 
In undertaking meditation so as to conform her attitude about MR to her reasons, Diane 
violates the conditions on exercising rational agency given by agentialists.6 As Moran describes 
the exercise of rational agency in deliberation, “there is no further thing [the deliberator] does to 
make [his] conclusion his actual belief or his intention” (Moran 2001, 131). But after deliberating 
about the issue of MR, there is a further thing Diane does to adjust her attitude so that it fits 
with her conclusion. Nor does Diane exercise the kind of “active ongoing governance” involved 
in rational believing on Boyle’s view (Boyle 2009, 143). She controls her attitude “extrinsically”, 
reshaping it through her meditation practice.7  
Diane’s efforts do not qualify as an exercise of rational agency because her reasons don’t 
shape her attitudes directly. What makes the process indirect in the relevant sense is that, in order 
to bring her attitude into alignment with her reasons, she deliberately engages in a non-rational 
process, viz., mindfulness meditation. 
Now even in exercises of rational agency, there are presumably various non-rational 
factors that mediate between reasons and attitudes. Let’s assume that Diane’s grasp of the 
evidence for MR skepticism is somehow realized in her neurophysiology. The process by which 
this neurophysiological event yields a belief that we lack MR may involve other 
neurophysiological factors that mediate between that event and the formation of the belief. But 
such indirectness is beside the point. Reasons may directly shape a belief in the sense required 
for rational agency even if non-rational processing, e.g. at the neurophysiological level, causally 
mediates between (the recognition of) evidence for p and the belief that p. The agentialist denies 
that Diane’s way of transforming her attitude is an exercise of rational agency not because there 
is some non-rational factor causally mediating between her reason and her attitude, but because 
Diane transforms her attitude only by deliberately resorting to a non-rational process.  
The agentialist sees Diane’s means of transforming her attitude as problematic because it 
involves Diane’s deliberately engaging in a non-rational process to bring about the desired result. 
Now since Diane’s method for revising her attitude takes time, and is presumably less reliable 
than the exercise of rational agency, Diane’s indirect method is instrumentally inferior to an 
exercise of rational agency. But the agentialist holds that Diane is not the responsible author of this 
 
6 This is not to say that Diane doesn’t exercise rational agency at all. In working through the arguments for 
MR skepticism, she may well form beliefs directly on the basis of reasons: e.g., she may accept 
incompatibilism directly on the basis of evaluating the Consequence Argument. But that is just to say that her 
judgment about MR directly conforms to her reasons. My concern is with how she achieves alignment between 
her attitude (her belief or belief-like attitude) and her reasons. The shift in Diane’s attitude about MR from 
Stage 1 to Stage 3, towards greater alignment with her reasons, is not purely an exercise of rational agency.  
7 Diane similarly violates Burge’s conditions on critical reasoning. Her method does not qualify as critical 
reasoning because she “face[s] the question how, by what means, to make [her] reasons effective” (Burge 
1996, 113), and relies on a deliberate strategy for accomplishing this, namely, mindfulness meditation. 
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attitude, as she would be if it were directly responsive to her reasons. That agentialist claim, the 
Normative Significance of Rational Agency thesis, is my primary concern here.  
Before mounting my challenge to that thesis, I will digress to consider whether Diane’s 
initial, recalcitrant attitude about MR is a genuine belief. 
5.  Is Diane’s recalcitrant attitude a belief? 
At Stage 1, Diane has a recalcitrant attitude about MR. This attitude is at odds with her 
considered judgment about MR. It is linked to her emotions (righteous indignation at the oil 
company executive) and it influences her reasoning (thinking that he deserves this ill treatment) 
and her behavior (scratching the car). Is this recalcitrant attitude a belief that we possess MR? 
And does Diane believe in MR skepticism at Stage 1, or does she acquire this belief only at Stage 
3? The answers to these questions depend, of course, on how we understand belief. 
I favor Schwitzgebel’s approach to belief: “To believe that p … is nothing more than to 
match to an appropriate degree and in appropriate respects the dispositional stereotype for 
believing that p” (Schwitzgebel 2002, p. 253). The dispositional stereotype for believing that p 
includes being disposed to act and to reason as if p is true. For example, to believe that Miguel is 
discreet is to be disposed to share confidences with him, to assure others that he can keep a 
secret, and to infer, when Miguel reports a bit of sensitive news, that he was not asked to keep 
this information to himself.8 The stereotype also includes affective dispositions. If you believe 
that Miguel is discreet, you feel at ease talking with him, and would feel surprise upon learning 
that he had betrayed a confidence. These dispositions are linked with occurrent thoughts and 
judgments—at least, if the belief is not recalcitrant. Dispositions to act and reason as if Miguel is 
discreet generally include a disposition to endorse the thought that he is (when the question 
arises), and are generally sensitive to occurrent judgments bearing on his discretion: e.g., if you 
heard him gossiping and judged Miguel is not so discreet after all, you would no longer be disposed 
to feel, act, and reason as if he were discreet. 
At Stage 1, Diane has some aspects of the dispositional stereotype of belief as regards we 
do not possess MR. She is disposed to assert “we are never morally responsible”, and to disagree 
with MR realists. She is disposed, upon recognizing that retributive considerations affect 
criminal sentencing, to conclude that our justice system is unjust. But in some other respects, 
she is disposed to feel, act, and reason as if we do have MR: e.g., to feel indignation towards the 
oil company executive, to blame him and try to punish him, and to think that he deserves 
comeuppance. Importantly, MR realism’s grip on Diane is not merely affective. She is disposed 
to judge that certain actions merit reward or retribution, and these judgments may be sensitive to 
evidence, albeit imperfectly so. 
The dispositional stereotype approach to belief does not settle the question as to what, 
precisely, Diane believes about MR at Stage 1. Settling that question would require deciding 
what’s needed to match the stereotype “to an appropriate degree and in appropriate respects” 
(ibid.). There is no consensus on that issue, and I will not take a position on it here. What’s 
important is that, on the dispositional stereotype approach, “belief” is not an all-or-nothing 
 
8 This characterization assumes a background of relevant desires and other attitudes. 
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affair. Instead, there is a multiplex spectrum of possible attitudes towards p, constituted by the 
extent to which the thinker is disposed to feel, act, and reason in certain ways.  
The table below loosely represents the spectrum of attitudes corresponding to the 
presence or absence of the relevant dispositions.  
 
 
Attitudes on the left end of this table are not beliefs, whereas attitudes on the right end 
are beliefs—that much is relatively uncontroversial. But it is controversial how much evidence 
sensitivity, inferential promiscuity, and alignment with occurrent judgments are minimally 
required for belief. I remain neutral on those questions. So I remain neutral on the question 
where, in rows C through E, the border between non-beliefs and beliefs falls. 9  
On the issue of MR, Diane’s dispositions at Stage 1 are mixed. Some correspond to MR 
skepticism, while others correspond to a belief in MR. Because of my neutrality about the 
minimally sufficient conditions for belief, I remain neutral as to how to characterize Diane’s 
situation at Stage 1. Depending on how one construes belief, she may have two conflicting 
beliefs, that is, she may both believe in MR skepticism and believe in MR realism; she may have 
neither of these beliefs, as her attitudes towards MR skepticism and MR realism may each fall 
short of belief; she may have exactly one of these beliefs, in skepticism or realism, in which case 
 
9 An especially illuminating example of disagreement as to what is minimally required for belief is the debate 
between Levy (2015) and Mandelbaum (2016). Mandelbaum argues that implicit attitudes, which fall towards 
the left end of the spectrum in rows C-E, are beliefs. He says that, unlike mere associations, implicit attitudes 
are responsive to argument and inferentially promiscuous, and can’t be eliminated by counterconditioning. 
Levy acknowledges that implicit attitudes have some features of belief: they are propositionally structured, 
and contribute to some inference-like transitions on the basis of their (propositional) content. But he thinks 
that their reasons-sensitivity and role in inferences are too limited and fragmented to qualify them as full-
fledged beliefs. He calls them “patchy endorsements”.  
 
 
“Aliefs” 
(Gendler 
2008) 
Implicit 
attitudes 
Clear cases of 
belief 
Beliefs as held by 
an ideal rational 
thinker 
A Structure Associative Propositional Propositional Propositional 
B 
Associated 
dispositions 
Behavioral, 
affective 
Behavioral, 
affective 
Behavioral, 
affective 
Behavioral, 
affective 
C 
Evidence 
sensitivity 
Little sensitivity                                                    Perfectly attuned 
to evidence                                                                   to evidence 
D 
Inferential 
promiscuity 
Affect few relevant                                              Affect all relevant 
inferences appropriately                             inferences appropriately 
E 
Relation to 
occurrent 
judgments 
Frequently conflict with                                             Always match 
occurrent judgments                                        occurrent judgments 
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that belief is diluted by its partial insensitivity to evidence or by the presence of divergent 
dispositions.  
What interests me is Diane’s overall attitude towards we possess MR—that is, the entire set 
of varied, sometimes competing dispositions that she has, relevant to we possess MR—and how 
that overall attitude shifts with her deliberate effort to transform it. The key point is this. At 
Stage 1, Diane’s overall attitude concerning the question of MR is far from that of an ideal 
rational thinker, one whose dispositions mesh perfectly and are perfectly attuned to her 
evidence—represented by the rightmost column of Table 1. (To sidestep certain controversies 
unrelated to my central point here, I will stipulate that both Diane and the “ideal rational 
thinker” are in situations that are ideal from the perspective of rationality in that they do not 
face the kind of problem introduced by higher-order evidence.10) At Stage 3, Diane’s overall 
attitude towards we possess MR is far more cohesive and more aligned with her evidence than it 
was at Stage 1. Her attitude more closely approximates a belief held by an ideal rational thinker.  
My point is that, by deliberately engaging in a non-rational process, Diane shifts her 
attitude about MR so that she comes to approximate the rational ideal with respect to this 
attitude. Her attitude about MR shifts into alignment with her evidence. Moreover, Diane’s 
belief in MR skepticism matches her occurrent judgments about that issue, and it is poised to 
contribute to inferences and thereby to serve as a reason that shapes other attitudes. And Diane 
is no longer disposed to act, reason, and feel as if MR realism were true. So at Stage 3, Diane’s 
MR skepticism at least approximates the profile of an attitude in an ideal rational thinker. 
Some agentialists will balk at the dispositional approach to beliefs, claiming that it 
assimilates all beliefs to what are in fact marginal cases. According to these agentialists, the core 
notion of belief is the notion of a judgment-sensitive doxastic commitment. Coliva nicely outlines 
what this notion involves. In her view, doxastic commitments (a) result from the assessment of 
evidence, (b) are constrained by norms of reasoning, (c) are regarded by the subject as 
constrained by norms of reasoning, and (d) are states for which the subject is held rationally 
responsible (paraphrased from Coliva 2012, 219). Clearly, Diane’s overall attitude towards MR at 
Stage 1 does not qualify as a doxastic commitment, as some of its elements resist the force of 
evidence and it is not adequately constrained by norms of reasoning, in particular by the norm 
that beliefs should align with evidence.  
But Diane’s attitude at Stage 3, which approximates a belief held by an ideal rational 
thinker, arguably does qualify as a doxastic commitment. (The requirement that doxastic 
commitments are shaped directly by reasons would of course beg the question in this context.) I 
will argue that Diane’s revision of her attitude—the process she uses to shift from Stage 1 to 
Stage 3—is guided by her assessment of the evidence and her application of the norm that 
beliefs should align with evidence, and that she is rationally responsible for applying this norm 
 
10 On the problem of higher-order evidence, see Roush 2017. Although I don’t have the space to discuss this 
here, I believe that the spirit of agentialist views like Moran’s and Boyle’s favors what Horowitz calls the 
Non-Akrasia Constraint: “it can never be rational to have high confidence in something like, ‘P, but my 
evidence doesn’t support P’.” (Horowitz 2014, 718) If that is correct, my stipulation that an ideal rational 
thinker does not face the problem of higher-order evidence is unneeded in the current context, for the 
agentialist will grant that, for an ideally rational thinker, evidence and rational beliefs will not diverge in the 
way envisioned by those who reject the Non-Akrasia Constraint. 
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and for her Stage 3 attitude. So although Diane makes use of non-rational means to revise her 
attitude, that revision process has whatever normative significance attaches to exercises of 
rational agency. 
6.  Diane’s attitude revision is rational 
6.1  Diane’s attitude revision appears to be rational 
Diane’s decision to reshape her attitude, and the overall process by which she 
accomplishes this, are rational in various respects. Careful deliberation has led her to conclude 
that the evidence—in the form of philosophical arguments—favors MR skepticism. Her 
commitment is to satisfying the rational norm that beliefs should conform to evidence is what 
drives her to take up mindfulness meditation when she comes to recognize that her attitude 
about MR is in the grip of affective factors (given her evidence that mindfulness meditation 
loosens the grip of affective factors). She comes to wholeheartedly embrace MR skepticism 
because this is the position her reasons dictate. Her efforts eliminate dispositions that are in 
tension with her evidence, such as the disposition to blame people for their actions. Finally, the 
connection between Diane’s evidence and her attitude doesn’t involve any deviant causal links of 
the sort that would prevent her evidence from rationalizing her attitude (Davidson 1973). So 
Diane’s evidence for MR skepticism both explains and rationalizes her belief in MR skepticism.  
6.2 The role of practical reasoning 
Agentialists can agree that Diane’s reshaping of her attitude is rational in these respects. 
But they will deny that it is an exercise of rational agency, since she manages to conform her 
belief to her reasons only by deliberately engaging in the non-rational exercise of mindfulness 
meditation. In Diane’s case, the indirect route from reasons to belief involves the use of practical 
reasoning. Her decision to take up mindfulness meditation is precisely a response to the 
problem Moran describes: the “need to find some way to make [my conclusion] my own, my 
actual state of mind” (Moran ibid.). And meditation is precisely a means of controlling her 
mental state “extrinsically”, that is, outside the space of reasons (Boyle ibid). That practical 
reasoning plays this role in Diane’s efforts means that the belief resulting from those efforts 
does not express rational agency. 
What differentiates Diane’s method from the exercise of rational agency is the specific 
role that practical reasoning plays; it is not simply that practical reasoning is involved. One can 
exercise rational agency even when relying on practical reasoning as part of a larger deliberation 
aimed at discovering what is true. Suppose I’m asked where I’ll be at 6 pm. I consult the weather 
forecast, and on that basis I decide to leave the office by 5 pm, so as to arrive home before an 
expected thunderstorm. This bit of practical reasoning about when to depart informs my 
theoretical reasoning, leading me to judge that I’ll be home at 6 pm. So long as that judgment 
directly results from my theoretical reasoning, it is an expression of rational agency.11  
 
11 Similarly, one can exercise rational agency even when relying on theoretical reasoning in a larger 
deliberation aimed at deciding what to do. In deciding when to leave, I may rely on theoretical reasoning 
about my chance of getting caught in a thunderstorm if I were to leave at 5:15 given that the forecast predicts 
that the storm will begin at 5:30. This bit of theoretical reasoning then informs my practical reasoning, leading 
me to decide to leave by 5 pm. So long as that decision results directly from my practical reasoning, it is an 
expression of rational agency. 
 11 
In the case just described, practical reasoning’s role in generating or sustaining belief is 
limited to providing reasons bearing on the truth of the belief. My decision to leave the office by 
5 pm provides evidence (via my awareness of this decision) about where I will be at 6 pm. Since 
my practical reasoning serves only as a source of evidence in this case, it does not mediate 
between my evidence and my belief. By contrast, Diane’s practical reasoning mediates between 
her evidence and her belief, for it concerns how to bring her attitude into line with her reasons. That 
issue—and hence, the result of her practical deliberation—does not bear on the truth of her 
belief, which concerns whether we possess moral responsibility. 
6.3  The wrong kind of reasons? 
As the case of Diane illustrates, a belief can be rationalized and justified by reasons, and 
held on the basis of those reasons, even when the reasons’ influence on the belief is indirect. 
Why think that believing indirectly on the basis of suitable reasons is somehow problematic, 
rather than simply less efficient and reliable than having beliefs that are directly reasons-
responsive?  
One familiar concern is that, when practical reasoning contributes to a belief-forming 
process, the resulting belief may be based on the “wrong kind of reasons”. 12 Diane’s eventual 
wholehearted belief in MR skepticism would face this problem if, for example, her reason for 
endorsing MR skepticism (and thus for taking steps to reshape her attitude) was that she 
determined that this would improve her tenure chances, since her colleagues heavily favor MR 
skepticism. But in the scenario as described Diane’s eventual wholehearted belief in MR 
skepticism does not rest on such “wrong kind” reasons. Her reasons exclusively concern the 
issue of MR, and those reasons bear on the truth about that issue.13  
Still, I suspect that the “wrong kind of reasons” worry may be playing a more subtle role 
here. The question of how to bring an attitude into alignment with your reasons arises only 
when your attitudes are not perfectly integrated with your reasons—that is, only when you fail to 
exercise rational agency. In wrestling with that question, the guiding principle “fit attitudes to 
reasons” becomes more or less explicit. And awareness of that principle might naturally lead you 
to consider whether there are alternative principles you might adopt in shaping your attitudes: 
e.g., a pragmatic principle such as “strive for attitudes that maximize happiness”. In short, a 
failure of rational agency, and the resulting recognition of “fit attitudes to reasons” as a guiding 
principle, can open the conceptual space for challenges to the assumption that conformance to 
reasons is the sine qua none of attitudes such as beliefs and intentions. 
However, although reflection on the goal of fitting attitudes to reasons may reveal the 
conceptual possibility of alternative principles for attitude formation, it does not cast doubt on 
the presumption that conformance to reasons (of the right kind) is the sole factor by which 
attitudes should be evaluated. So it does not support the idea that an alternative, possibly 
pragmatic principle could be legitimate. Engaging in practical reasoning as part of the process of 
aligning attitudes to reasons, as Diane does, could perhaps inspire the thinker to entertain 
alternative principles for shaping attitudes. But that is a psychological phenomenon, not grounds 
 
12 For a useful discussion of the “wrong kinds of reasons” debate, see Gertken and Kiesewetter 2017.  
13 For a forceful challenge to the idea that consequentialist and other considerations are wrong kinds of 
reasons, see Reisner (2018). 
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for an objection to the idea that beliefs should be shaped exclusively by evidence. The need to 
figure out how to align one’s attitudes to one’s reasons does nothing to undermine the idea that 
attitudes should be evaluated solely by their conformance to the right kind of reasons. 
6.4  Practical vs. epistemic rationality 
The agentialist may object that while Diane’s revision of her belief is rational, the kind of 
rationality it exhibits is practical rationality, whereas the agentialist’s concern is with epistemic 
rationality. Tristram McPherson has raised this objection in conversation, using an example he 
calls Bad Diane. Bad Diane’s attitude about MR is exactly similar to Diane’s attitude at Stage 1: it 
is the same mix of dispositions corresponding to skepticism and realism about MR. Like Diane, 
Bad Diane recognizes that her attitude about MR is not aligned with her evidence. But this 
recognition does not move Bad Diane to action. She feels no concern about it whatsoever. 
According to the objection at hand, Diane and Bad Diane are on a par as regards epistemic 
rationality. They conform to epistemic norms in precisely the same way, and to precisely the 
same degree, in evaluating the arguments for MR skepticism and in assessing the relation 
between their attitude about MR and their evidence. Diane is more rational only as regards 
practical rationality: she forms intentions that conform to what her reasons dictate, namely, to 
(try to) align her beliefs with her evidence. Bad Diane has equal reason to try to align her beliefs 
with her evidence, so her failure to form the appropriate intentions is a failure of practical 
rationality. 
This point constitutes a challenge to my Diane example only insofar as that example 
requires that Diane’s way of aligning her attitude with her reasons—her shift from Stage 1 to 
Stage 3—exhibits purely epistemic rationality. But my example does not require this. The 
agentialist thesis targeted by my example concerns the normative significance of rational agency, 
where the rationality involved in “rational agency” encompasses both epistemic and practical 
rationality: that is, the capacities to reason about what is true and about what to do. To exercise 
rational agency is to respond in a certain way to reasons—where these reasons may be epistemic 
or practical reasons, and where the response may be a belief or an intention. The case of Diane 
is designed to challenge the normative significance of the directness involved in rational agency. 
Diane’s means of aligning her attitude with her reasons is a rational (albeit indirect) response to 
reasons, and issues in the appropriate attitude (a belief that fits her evidence).  
McPherson’s objection is a way of interpreting the agentialist claim that the “need to find 
some way to make [my conclusion] my own, my actual state of mind” is “an expression of the 
failure of reasoning” (Moran 2001, 131). The suggestion is that the need to engage in practical 
reasoning about how to align one’s beliefs with one’s evidence expresses a failure of epistemic 
(theoretical) reasoning. I readily grant that the need to engage in practical reasoning is a sign of 
imperfect rationality, since ideally rational beings always exercise rational agency, and so they 
always believe directly on the basis of their evidence. The issue at hand is whether ideally 
rational responses to reasons have a non-instrumental normative significance that is absent from 
exercises of imperfect rationality like Diane’s. 
6.5  Why Diane’s attitude revision is rational 
Diane’s reshaping of her attitude is rational. It is undertaken with the goal of conforming 
her attitude to her evidence, and it succeeds in achieving that goal by the use of methods that 
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(let’s stipulate) she has good reason to trust.14 Diane’s reasons for endorsing MR skepticism—
the reasons she acquires through deliberation—both explain and rationalize her belief. The 
process Diane uses to revise her attitude about MR takes some time, so her attitude is out of 
alignment with her reasons for an extended period; and her method is less reliable than rational 
agency. Still, Diane believes in MR skepticism because that is the position that her reasons 
dictate. Moreover, we can suppose that if she were to become persuaded by a new argument for 
MR realism, she would come to embrace that position, either immediately or through a 
deliberate process of revising her attitude. 
Moran describes a case like Diane’s as a “failure of reasoning” (Moran 2001, 131). But it 
seems to me that reasoning succeeds when it generates and rationalizes an appropriate belief, 
even if the path from reasoning to belief is indirect. Diane’s Stage 3 belief about MR is explained 
and rationalized by her evidence, and it is sensitive to new evidence. Although her means of 
achieving and maintaining alignment between her evidence and her reasons is non-optimal, her 
belief is nevertheless rationally formed and rationally maintained.  
7.  Diane is responsible for her revised belief 
7.1  Accounts of responsible agency 
For current purposes, we should grant the agentialist idea that believing and intending 
are exercises of agency, for which the thinker bears responsibility. (Of course, the skeptical 
arguments about MR that Diane finds persuasive apply equally to non-moral responsibility, but 
in order to engage with the agentialist I’ll assume that those arguments aren’t sound.)  
Diane appears to satisfy plausible conditions for responsibility, relative to the shift in her 
attitude about MR. To make this case, I’ll briefly explain how Diane meets the conditions for 
responsible agency given by the three leading approaches to understanding responsibility: 
hierarchical accounts, reasons-responsive accounts, and Strawsonian accounts. These 
approaches are usually associated with compatibilism. But most libertarians adopt one or 
another of these approaches, supplementing their favored approach with the further 
requirement that indeterminism affects the decision or action for which the agent is responsible, 
or some step leading up to that decision or action.  
Hierarchical accounts take responsibility for j-ing to consist in the fact that one’s j-ing, 
or deciding to j, is guided by one’s values or by what one endorses as good reasons. By this 
standard, Diane is responsible for her revised attitude. Her revision of her attitude is guided by 
her values: in particular, her commitment to believing what the evidence supports. It is because 
of this commitment that she goes to such lengths to bring her belief into alignment with her 
evidence. And she accepts MR skepticism because she endorses certain arguments as providing 
good reason to do so.  
Reasons-responsive accounts take responsibility for j-ing to consist in the capacity to 
recognize and respond to reasons to j (or not to j). Diane has this capacity: she can recognize 
 
14 We can stipulate this without assuming that mindfulness meditation is actually effective in neutralizing 
reactive emotions, since a false claim can be backed by good evidence. Diane’s evidence could derive from 
scientific articles in reputable journals, describing (what she reasonably takes to be) well-conducted studies of 
meditation.  
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and respond to reasons to believe in—and, we can suppose, to reject—MR skepticism. 15 These 
reasons are generated by her evaluation of philosophical arguments about MR. 
Strawsonian accounts take responsibility for j-ing to consist in its being appropriate for 
others to hold one responsible for j-ing, that is, to react to one’s j-ing in certain ways 
(including admiration and resentment). “To be responsible for something … is to be open to 
certain sorts of assessment on account of that thing, and … to be the appropriate target of 
certain sorts of reactions on account of it” (Hieronymi 2014, 9). As Diane brings her attitude 
into alignment with her reasons, it seems appropriate to admire her for believing what her 
evidence supports. Depending on whether one takes Diane to be accountable for her tendency 
towards indignation and related affective dispositions, the fact that achieving this alignment 
requires a struggle may increase or diminish the degree of admiration that is appropriate.  
Diane meets the conditions for responsibility associated with the three leading 
approaches to this issue. So if any of these leading accounts of responsible agency are correct, 
Diane is responsible for revising her attitude and for the result of that revision, her acceptance 
of MR skepticism. 
7.2  Is this the right kind of responsible agency? 
The agentialist may object that the accounts of responsible agency just canvassed 
concern voluntaristic agency—or “mere control” —whereas rational agency is a matter of 
“authority”, a distinctive, non-voluntaristic type of agency. However, those accounts are 
intended to be quite general. In fact, some accounts of responsibility for belief adopt the 
reasons-responsive approach, the Strawsonian approach, or some combination thereof (e.g. 
Hieronymi 2014, McHugh 2014, Wedgwood 2013). Most importantly, these accounts are 
intended to reflect our basic conception of responsible agency.  
7.3  Why Diane’s attitude revision is agential 
According to the leading approaches to responsible agency, Diane is responsible both for 
revising her attitude about MR and for her Stage 3 belief in MR skepticism. 
The Normative Significance of Rational Agency thesis implies that Diane’s way of 
revising her attitude is not only instrumentally sub-optimal but normatively problematic in some 
more basic sense. However, it is difficult to see why her process should be thought to be 
problematic. Diane’s belief in MR skepticism is guided by her values—in particular, her 
commitment to rational norms. Her belief is generated and sustained by a reasons-responsive 
mechanism, and she is the appropriate target of reactive attitudes in virtue of it. Diane’s 
successful struggle to align her belief to her evidence thus exemplifies responsible agency, 
according to leading accounts of responsible agency. So her efforts to revise her attitude, and the 
revised attitude that results from those efforts, have whatever normative significance attaches to 
exercises of responsible agency. 
 
15 Reasons-responsive accounts of responsibility do not generally require, for responsible agency, that the 
reasons to which the agent responds are the best reasons in an objective sense. If they did require this, then 
agents would be responsible for only those actions that are guided by an ideal and correct evaluation of 
reasons. But some responsibility theorists do take responsibility to require an ability to recognize and respond 
to good reasons (Wolf 1990, Nelkin 2011). 
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8.  Diane’s attitude revision is first-personal 
8.1 Control and the first person 
According to agentialism, one is estranged from those attitudes that are not directly 
sensitive to one’s reasons: such attitudes are, in some sense, not truly one’s own. Insofar as an 
attitude is truly mine, I am responsible for it, and I exert rational agency relative to it.  In 
describing the possibility of shaping an attitude by a means other than reflection on reasons, 
Moran says “This ‘external’ sort of activity and responsibility is not essentially first-personal at 
all” (Moran 2001, 118). 
The previous section made clear that Diane bears first-person responsibility for her Stage 
3 belief. That belief is shaped and sustained by her values, including her commitment to rational 
norms; it is responsive to her reasons; and she is an appropriate target of reactive attitudes on 
account of it.  
Still, the agentialist seems concerned with the possibility that Diane’s approach—
engaging in a non-rational process to revise her attitude—could be used to shape someone else’s 
attitude.16 Suppose that Diane manages to brainwash her friend into believing MR skepticism. In 
that case, Diane would bear responsibility for her friend’s belief. But that belief would not be 
rational in the way that Diane’s belief in MR skepticism is: it is not explained or rationalized by 
the believer’s sense of the evidence. Diane’s revision of her attitude about MR is first-personal 
because it is rationalized by her evidence for MR skepticism, and explained by her commitment to 
believing in accord with the evidence. Bringing someone else to believe that p cannot be 
rationalized (simply) by my evidence for p, and the effort to transform someone else’s belief 
cannot be explained by my commitment to rational norms. These normative elements are first-
personal: that Diane undertakes a deliberate process to arrive at a rationally-held belief, and 
thereby to satisfy the corresponding rational norm, does not make the attitude any less her own. 
The particular reasons and values that drive Diane to revise her belief, and that make that 
revision rational, also make it first-personal. 
8.2 Considering a belief as a belief 
Here is another reason one might think that only attitudes that express rational agency 
are truly our own. Assessing an attitude as recalcitrant requires seeing it as an object rather than 
simply seeing the world through its lens, so to speak. And it is the latter—e.g., Diane’s seeing the 
world as containing persons possessing MR, as opposed to considering “we possess MR” as a 
psychological state—that makes the state truly one’s own. (Hence the metaphor of transparency 
in the claim that we can grasp what we believe about p by simply considering whether p. In this 
metaphor, the belief is the transparent lens through which we view the world.) 
Considering a belief as a belief—that is, as a psychological state—certainly differs from 
simply seeing the world through its lens. But this doesn’t mean that considering it as a 
psychological state makes it less one’s own. Although Diane regards elements of her Stage 1 
attitude about MR as recalcitrant, she can nonetheless see the world through the lens of those 
elements: when she feels moral indignation towards the oil company executive, he seems to her 
 
16 Obviously, one could use a rational process to shape someone else’s belief, by presenting them with an 
argument. When this attempt succeeds, the shift in belief is best explained by the believer’s own deliberation. 
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blameworthy and deserving of retribution. The ability to recognize a belief—whether it is recalcitrant 
or not—requires thinking about beliefs as such. But the ability to recognize a belief as a belief 
does not hinder us from seeing the world through its lens. 
In fact, considering a psychological state as such can arguably enhance one’s agency 
relative to that state. This idea is related to a point that McGeer (2008) develops in critiquing 
Moran’s agentialist view. Moran holds that we have agential responsibility for our attitudes 
insofar as those attitudes are directly reasons-responsive. McGeer argues that limiting first-
person agency to this kind of reasons-responsiveness is unduly restrictive. Given that we are not 
perfectly rational, she says, fulfilling our responsibility for our own attitudes sometimes requires 
adopting a detached, third-person perspective on our cognitive lives. From this perspective, we 
can better identify biases, impulses, and other non-rational factors affecting our sense of our 
reasons (McGeer ibid., 102).  
I think McGeer is entirely right about this. Moreover, the case of Diane supports and 
extends her point. It shows that adopting a detached, third-person perspective is required not 
only for recognizing the influence of non-rational factors on our sense of our reasons, but also 
for blunting that influence.17 Diane is able to effect the shift in her attitude only by adopting a 
detached perspective—that is, by refusing to identify with her retributive impulses, 
condemnatory thoughts, and other recalcitrant elements of her attitude about MR, regarding 
them as unfortunate features of her psychology.  
Of course, Diane would not need to resort to methods that Moran and Boyle regard as 
mere “control” if her attitude about MR conformed directly to her assessment of the arguments. 
But that is just to say that she wouldn’t need to resort to an indirect process if a direct one was 
operative.  
8.3  Why Diane’s attitude revision is first-personal 
The agentialist holds that only those attitudes that express rational agency truly belong to 
the thinker. I have suggested that attitudes belong to the thinker so long as they are explained and 
rationalized by the thinker’s reasons, including a commitment to rational norms—regardless of 
whether the thinker believes directly on the basis of those reasons or exploits a non-rational 
process to bring her attitude into line with her reasons. (My claim here is that this suffices for 
belonging to the thinker, not that it is necessary.) And given that we are imperfect thinkers, and 
therefore have some recalcitrant attitudes, adopting a detached perspective can enhance our 
agency, enabling us to identify and correct recalcitrant attitudes.18 
 
17 Levy (2016) makes a related point about addiction. Alcoholics Anonymous encourages participants to 
describe themselves third-personally, with the famous phrase “My name is X and I’m an alcoholic”. Levy 
argues that the practice of regarding oneself in this way can be helpful in combatting addiction, since for an 
addict the reasons to drink or take a drug can appear, at the moment of choice, stronger than the reasons not 
to do so. In such cases, deciding what to do by directly considering what you have most reason to do can lead 
to backsliding on a previous commitment to quit. 
18 Borgoni (2015) addresses a related concern, arguing that we have privileged first-person access to our 
recalcitrant attitudes. 
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9. Is rational agency required to avoid a regress?  
It might be argued that, on pain of regress, one can undertake to bring one’s attitudes 
into alignment with one’s reasons only by some exercise of rational agency. For in order to try to 
adopt attitude B on the basis of reasons R, one must recognize that R favor B. But that 
recognition—the judgment that reasons R favor B, e.g. that the evidence points to p—is, in the 
best case, a response to reasons. If it’s a direct response, then rational agency is involved. If it’s 
not a direct response, this means that the thinker must take up the task of bringing her 
attitude—in this case, towards R favor B—into alignment with her reasons. And that in turn 
requires recognizing that her reasons favor that judgment, a recognition that (in the best case) is 
a response to reasons. On pain of regress, at some point in the deliberative process an attitude—
e.g., a judgment as to where the evidence points, or what one’s reasons favor—must be shaped 
by one’s reasons directly. 
I’m happy to grant this claim for current purposes. It means that rational agency plays a 
crucial role in Diane’s case, in that it makes her efforts to conform her attitude to her reasons 
possible. More generally, the regress argument shows that rational agency will contribute to any 
case of believing on the basis of reasons. But this is just to say that some direct connection between 
reasons and attitudes is a necessary component of any process in which reasons shape attitudes 
indirectly.  
It’s worth noting that the regress argument does not imply that there must be a direct 
connection between reasons favoring a belief that p and the judgment that p. Consider the 
following case. I recognize that my reasons favor my friend is guilty of a serious offense, but my 
emotional investment in her innocence makes it difficult for me to embrace this conclusion even 
in the way required for a momentary judgment. I acknowledge that I should judge her to be 
guilty, yet I’m unable to see her as guilty. I might then make recourse to non-rational means to 
help me embrace this conclusion: e.g., by engaging in some non-rational exercise aimed to blunt 
the influence of my emotions on my judgment. In this case, my evaluation of my reasons 
directly shapes my judgment that I should consider her guilty, but the connection between my 
reasons and my eventual judgment that she is guilty is indirect in that it rests on a non-rational 
process. 
10.  Must we assume that deliberation will directly shape our attitudes? 
10.1  Moran’s requirement  
I have just conceded that rational agency may always play a crucial role in an agent’s 
conforming her attitudes to her reasons, even in cases like Diane’s where the attitude in question 
is only indirectly shaped by reasons. This concession may appear to surrender one motivation 
for challenging the Normative Significance of Rational Agency thesis. That motivation is to 
avoid the idea that we cannot coherently embark on rational deliberation unless we make what 
Moran describes as “a presupposition of rational thought”: the assumption that “what I believe 
about something [is] the expression of my sense of the reasons relating to the content of that 
belief” (Moran 2012, 232). Moran elsewhere calls this “a Transcendental assumption of Rational 
Thought”, and aptly describes it as being “as venerable and familiar as it is obscure” (Moran 
2003, 406). This suggests that (at least our presumption of) rational agency has a special 
normative significance. 
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 [If a thinker takes] his belief or his intentional action to be up to something 
other than his sense of the best reasons, … then there’s no point in his 
deliberating about what to do. Indeed, there is no point in calling it 
‘deliberation’ any more, if he takes it to be an open question whether this 
activity will determine what he actually does or believes. (Moran 2001, 127) 
There are various ways to unpack the idea that beliefs’ conforming to reasons is a 
“presupposition of rational thought”. On a weak reading, it means that I will not be motivated 
to deliberate unless I assume that deliberation will issue in a judgment as to whether p (or a 
judgment to the effect that, given my current evidence, I should withhold belief as to whether p). 
But it’s not entirely clear that even on this weak interpretation Moran’s claim is correct. It seems 
possible to embark on deliberation about whether my friend is guilty while acknowledging that I 
may be incapable of judging her guilty even if I conclude that there is strong evidence of her 
guilt.  
In any case, Moran appears to be making a stronger claim here, namely that I will not be 
motivated to deliberate unless I assume that my deliberation will issue in a belief as to whether p: 
that is, a relatively stable set of dispositions fitting the stereotype for a belief that p or that not-p 
(or dispositions corresponding to withholding from a belief as to p).  
10.2  Why we needn’t assume that deliberation directly shapes our beliefs or intentions 
It seems to me that we can coherently engage in deliberation without assuming that this 
process will directly shape our beliefs or intentions. Consider the following scenario. Carly hasn’t 
read Hume’s skeptical argument about induction. But she has heard that the argument concludes 
that our inductive beliefs are not epistemically justified. She also knows that Hume predicted 
that even those persuaded by his argument would continue to rely on induction—that is, to act 
and reason as if past events were a reliable guide to what will occur in the future. Before working 
through Hume’s argument, Carly might reflect as follows.  
Although my deliberations about induction (guided by my evaluation of 
Hume’s argument) will presumably shape my judgment as to whether our 
inductive beliefs are justified, they may not shape my inductive beliefs 
themselves. So I may continue to believe that the sun will rise tomorrow, 
even if I judge that I have no reason (of the “right” kind) for that belief—
that is, even if my “sense of the best reasons” (Moran ibid.) dictate 
withholding belief as to whether the sun will rise tomorrow.  
These reflections do not prevent Carly from deliberating about induction by evaluating Hume’s 
skeptical argument. This scenario casts doubt on Moran’s claim that to engage in deliberation 
one must presuppose that “what I believe about something [is] the expression of my sense of 
the reasons relating to the content of that belief” (Moran 2012, 232).  
 Similarly, suppose that Diane initially approaches the question of MR with an open 
mind, and with no expectation as to whether she will be persuaded by the arguments for MR 
skepticism or will instead favor MR realism. Prior to working through these arguments, Diane 
might recognize that the idea that we are morally responsible permeates her habits of acting, 
reasoning, and responding to others, habits that are deeply rooted and difficult to break. So she 
could acknowledge that her deliberation about MR may not directly result in the corresponding 
revision of her dispositions. It is nonetheless perfectly reasonable—and, I think, even 
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admirable—for her to embark on the project of determining whether those dispositions should 
be altered, even as she recognizes that this alteration might require extended effort. 
10.3  Why we deliberate 
As a conceptual matter, it seems possible to embark on deliberation even if one doubts 
that it will have any effect on one’s dispositional beliefs. Some might engage in deliberation 
purely because they find it enjoyable. Moran would likely deny that this process deserves the 
name “deliberation”. But that is a verbal issue: if evaluating arguments purely for fun doesn’t 
qualify as “deliberation”, that is presumably for the trivial reason that the notion of deliberation 
is conceptually connected to the aim of shaping beliefs and intentions. 
In any case, such examples are outliers. Most of us deliberate with the aim of shaping our 
beliefs and intentions. But we sometimes recognize that the route from reaching a conclusion as 
to what we should believe or do, and forming the corresponding belief or intention, may be 
indirect. Prior to deliberating as to whether he should quit drinking, a heavy drinker will surely 
recognize that giving up alcohol would be challenging. He may even recognize that the prospect 
of quitting would be so daunting that, if his reasoning leads him to judge that it would be best to 
quit, he will need to struggle to form the intention dictated by his reasons. This case is not 
exceptional: we often deliberate about whether to j while recognizing that powerful reason to 
think that j-ing is best will not directly lead to our j-ing. One can engage in practical reasoning 
with the expectation (and hope) that such reasoning will affect one’s decisions and actions, while 
recognizing that conforming one’s intentions to one’s best reasons may involve an extended, 
tortuous process.  
As a general matter, we probably would not be motivated to deliberate unless we 
assumed that the outcome of our deliberation would shape our actions and beliefs. The case of 
the heavy drinker demonstrates that the assumption motivating a bit of practical reasoning may 
be only that engaging in practical reasoning will raise the likelihood of doing what’s best. And as 
the case of Carly illustrates, a truly open-minded thinker may embark on deliberation while 
recognizing that her beliefs may well resist the force of her evidence. So it seems perfectly 
coherent to deliberate without assuming that one’s intentions and beliefs will conform to the 
outcome of one’s deliberations immediately and directly. 
CONCLUSION  
The agentialist view envisions a stark contrast between two types of cases. The first are 
exercises of rational agency, in which a belief directly conforms to reasons. According to the 
agentialist, these involve a distinctive kind of agency with a special normative significance. The 
second are cases like Diane’s, in which the thinker struggles to bring her attitude into alignment 
with her reasons and succeeds only by resorting to non-rational methods. The agentialist sees 
those cases as deficient, lacking the normative significance that attaches to rational agency. I’ve 
argued that beliefs indirectly shaped by reasons are rationally held; that such beliefs are exercises 
of agency for which the thinker is responsible; that rational beliefs truly belong to the person 
whose reasons rationalize them; and that acknowledging a belief as a psychological state is 
compatible with acknowledging it as one’s own, and may even enable one to exercise greater 
agency relation to it. 
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It is easy to appreciate the value of rational agency. Believing and intending directly on 
the basis of what one regards as one’s best reasons is the maximally efficient and reliable way to 
avoid the kind of fragmentation that seems rationally problematic: having beliefs (or intentions) 
that diverge from the beliefs (or intentions) that one takes one’s reasons to favor. So rational 
agency is preferable, on instrumental grounds, to the indirect process Diane uses to align her 
attitude with her reasons. If the regress argument succeeds, then rational agency is also 
instrumentally significant in that it makes a crucial contribution to believing and intending on 
the basis of reasons even when the route from reasons to attitude is indirect.  
But it is hard to see why rational agency should be thought to have a normative 
significance not shared by the efforts of conscientious thinkers like Diane, when they diligently 
struggle to fit their attitudes to their reasons. We should recognize and respect the variety of 
strategies by which imperfect thinkers like us manage to bring our attitudes into closer alignment 
with our reasons, and thereby become less fragmented.19 
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